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CASENOTES
WIELDING THE AX OF NEUTRALITY: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF CHARITABLE CHOICE
IN THE WAKE OF MITCHELL V. HELMS
I. INTRODUCTION
During the past decade, the Supreme Court loosened restraints
that it had previously imposed upon government aid to religious
institutions. In 1996, Congress and the President seized upon this
phenomenon and implemented a controversial provision in the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
of 1996-also known as the Welfare Reform Act of 1996.' In-
cluded among the various revolutionary provisions of this legisla-
tion is something known as Charitable Choice. This program
authorizes states to contract with religious institutions to provide
social welfare services on behalf of the states.2
This, in and of itself, is not shocking. Many states already con-
tract with private social service providers including religiously af-
filiated institutions such as Catholic Ministries USA.' These in-
stitutions, however, operate separately from the sectarian
functions of the churches that sponsor them. They distribute so-
1. 42 U.S.C. § 604a (Supp. IV 1998).
2. See id.
3. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-725, at 316 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2649, 2704 (stating that the Child Care and Development Block Grant Act prohibits any
contracts or grants to any institution to be used for "sectarian purpose or activity" or to
any institution that discriminates on the basis of religion).
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cial services in a secular manner without reference to religious
beliefs or indoctrination. Charitable Choice is revolutionary,
though, because it authorizes state governments to distribute di-
rect federal monetary grants to religious institutions themselves.4
Additionally, the Charitable Choice program specifically prohibits
a state from denying aid to a religious institution if the admini-
stration of its social services involves religious exercises.5
In June 2000, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Mitchell
v. Helms.6 In Mitchell, the Court upheld the constitutionality of
Chapter 2 of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act
of 1981,' which permits direct government aid to religious schools
in the form of equipment loans.' A plurality of the Court upheld
the program, reasoning that direct aid to a religious institution is
constitutional so long as the distribution of aid results out of a
neutral and secular standard driven by the private decisions of
individuals.9 A majority of the Court, however, refused to endorse
the plurality's all-encompassing conception of private choice. °
Currently, it is not clear when and how direct government aid
to religious institutions violates the Establishment Clause."
Mitchell, however, will have a major impact on the constitutional
status of Charitable Choice. President Bush recently announced
the formation of a White House Office of Faith-Based and Com-
munity Initiatives, which will distribute $24 billion in Charitable
Choice aid to private religious organizations over the next ten
years." Numerous Charitable Choice programs already exist. 3
These controversial aid packages will have a major impact on the
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 604a(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1998).
5. See id. § 604a(c).
6. 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000) (plurality opinion).
7. 20 U.S.C. §§ 7301-7373 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
8. Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2537; 20 U.S.C. § 7351(b)(2) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
9. See Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2536-37.
10. See discussion infra Parts I.C-D.
11. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion.").
12. See Social Aid Plan Proposed, Bush: U.S. Funds for Churches, Charities Can
Boost Effectiveness, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Jan. 30, 2001, at Al; All Things Considered:
Faith-Based Initiatives (NPR radio broadcast, Jan. 24, 2001), available at
http://www.npr.orgramfiles/atc/20010124.act.14.ram.
13. See, e.g., Americans United for Separation of Church and State, at http//www.au.
org/cc-leg.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2001) (listing successful legislation containing Chari-
table Choice provisions, including The Youth, Drug and Mental Health Service Act of
1999).
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manner in which our government provides social services. It is
important, therefore, to delineate the contours of the Mitchell de-
cision and how it will affect the constitutional status of Charita-
ble Choice programs now and in the future.
Part II of this note will trace the evolution of the Supreme
Court's aid to religion jurisprudence decided under the Estab-
lishment Clause. This review demonstrates the slow and rocky
manipulation of the Court's original three-part Establishment
Clause test found in Lemon v. Kurtzman,4 up through the tests
radical transformation in Agostini v. Felton5 and Mitchell.
Part III focuses exclusively on an in-depth explanation of the
decision in Mitchell. This section contrasts the plurality's opinion,
authored by Justice Thomas, with the holdings in past cases, and
compares Justice Thomas's opinion with Justice O'Connor's con-
currence. Finally, this section examines and critiques Justice
Souter's dissent. Hopefully, from the Court's cacophony, we will
glean some conclusions as to the current rule of law and where
the Court is headed in the future.
Part IV examines the mechanics of Charitable Choice by pre-
senting and evaluating these mechanics under the guiding prin-
ciples of the Court's current stance in Mitchell. Viewed in this
manner, Charitable Choice violates the Establishment Clause be-
cause it does not have a secular purpose. Assuming that it does
have such a secular purpose, Charitable Choice still violates the
Establishment Clause because it authorizes direct cash payments
to the coffers of pervasively sectarian institutions. A social service
voucher program is the Charitable Choice program most likely to
survive constitutional scrutiny.
Part V focuses on the policy behind the two competing theories
of Establishment Clause interpretation-separationism and neu-
trality. 6 A significant portion of this section examines policy con-
cerns that religious organizations should take into account before
attempting to vie for government money.
14. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
15. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
16. See, e.g., ROBERT T. MILLER & RONALD B. FLOWERS, TOwARD BENEVOLENT
NEUTRALITY: CHURCH, STATE, AND THE SUPREME COURT (3d ed. 1987); FRANK J. SORAUF,
THE WALL OF SEPARATION: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF CHURCH AND STATE (1976).
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE OF
GOVERNMENT AID TO RELIGION
A. Everson v. Board of Education
In 1947, the Supreme Court ushered in its modern age of Es-
tablishment Clause jurisprudence with Everson v. Board of Edu-
cation.7 In Everson, a New Jersey statute authorized local school
districts to provide transportation reimbursements to parents of
children who attended private religiously oriented schools."8 This
was the first case to hold that the Establishment Clause, via the
Fourteenth Amendment, applies to state action as well as federal
government action.' 9
The Court upheld the New Jersey program. ° It found that a
general welfare program does not violate the Establishment
Clause when it minimally aids religion in a neutral manner.2'
The regulation only incidentally aided religious practice by pro-
viding safety and welfare benefits to clearly secular functions of
religious organizations.22 Moreover, the aid flowed to the parents,
not to the religious school.23 While such regulations may passively
aid religion, they do so without favoring religion.
B. Lemon v. Kurtzman
In the composite case of Lemon v. Kurtzman,' the Court re-
viewed the constitutionality of statutes in Rhode Island and
Pennsylvania that provided state aid to religious elementary and
secondary schools. The Rhode Island statute authorized a salary
supplement of up to fifteen percent for private school teachers of
secular subjects. 6 The Pennsylvania act authorized a reimburse-
17. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
18. See id. at 3.
19. See id. at 8, 16.
20. Id. at 18.
21. Id. at 17-18.
22. See id. at 18 ("Of course, cutting off church schools from these services, so separate
and so indisputably marked off from their religious function, would make it far more diffi-
cult for the schools to operate.").
23. See id. at 17.
24. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
25. Id. at 606.
26. See id. at 607.
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ment to nonpublic schools for teachers' salaries, textbooks, and
instructional materials-all pertaining to secular subjects."
Chief Justice Burger wrote the decision of the Court setting up
a three-pronged analysis for determining when state aid to relig-
ion violates the Establishment Clause.28 "First, the statute must
have a secular purpose; second, its principal or primary effect
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion[;] ... fi-
nally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government en-
tanglement with religion."'29 Applying the first criterion, the
Court held that both statutes had secular purposes because they
intended to enhance the quality of secular education in all
schools-both public and religious.3°
The Court did not decide whether the statutory schemes had
the effect of advancing religion."' Instead, it held that government
aid that funds religious exercise violates the Establishment
Clause.32 As for the Rhode Island program, the Court found that
the religious nature of the schools was so substantial that it justi-
fied a presumption that even secular teachers in those schools, to
some degree or another, will inculcate religious values.33 The
Court recognized that the state-installed procedural safeguards
necessarily involved a "comprehensive, discriminating, and con-
tinuing state surveillance" of religion that violates the Estab-
lishment Clause.34 The Court found that the Pennsylvania statute
possessed similar defects. The fact that the Pennsylvania statute
authorized direct cash grants to religious institutions, however,
troubled the Court the most.3  The Court overturned both stat-
utes due to the fact that they involved excessive entanglement. 6
27. See id. at 609-10.
28. See id. at 612-13.
29. Id. (citations omitted).
30. Id. at 613.
31. See id. at 613-14.
32. Id. at 625 ("Under our system the choice has been made that government is to be
entirely excluded from the area of religious instruction and churches excluded from the
affairs of government.").
33. Id. at 618 ("We simply recognize that a dedicated religious person, teaching in a
school affiliated with his or her faith and operated to inculcate its tenets, will inevitably
experience great difficulty in remaining religiously neutral.").
34. Id. at 619.
35. Id. at 621. Particularly, the Court was concerned with the state's power to inspect
a religious schools financial records in order to comply with the statute's mandate that
religious funds and secular funds be kept separate. See id.
36. Id. at 603.
20011
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C. The Lemon Test Applied
Over the next twenty-five years, the Supreme Court pulled,
twisted, molded, massacred, processed, decried, lambasted, and
manipulated Chief Justice Burger's Lemon test.37 This section
will briefly trace the major aid-to-religion cases.
1. Tilton v. Richardson
In Tilton v. Richardson,3 decided on the same day as Lemon,
the Court overturned a portion of the Higher Education Facilities
Act39 that authorized federal grants and loans to sectarian insti-
tutions of higher learning.4" While the Act contained a provision
prohibiting the use of the funds to construct facilities for sectar-
ian worship, the provision expired after twenty years.4'
Applying the Lemon test, the Court held that Congress enacted
the legislation with a secular purpose. 2 Under the second prong,
however, the Court found that if, after expiration of the twenty-
year prohibitory period, the benefited religious institutions used
the facilities for sectarian worship, then the government's grant
would result in religious advancement.
Under its entanglement analysis, the Court drew a distinction
between secondary schools and universities.' Unlike the elemen-
tary schools in Lemon, providing a secular education was the
primary mission of the religiously affiliated universities receiving
37. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384,
398 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that re-
peatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried,
Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening the little
children and school attorneys of Center Moriches Union Free School District.").
38. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
39. 20 U.S.C. § 751(a)(2) (1964).
40. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 675, 689.
41. See id. at 675.
42. Id. at 676-77.
43. See id. at 683 ("If, at the end of 20 years, the building is, for example, converted
into a chapel or otherwise used to promote religious interests, the original federal grant
will in part have the effect of advancing religion.").
44. See id. at 687 ("Since religious indoctrination is not a substantial purpose or ac-
tivity of these church-related colleges and universities, there is less likelihood than in
primary and secondary schools that religion will permeate the area of secular education.").
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funds in Tilton.45 According to the Court, continued government
surveillance to ensure compliance with restrictions on religious
discourse is less of a concern in this context.46 Additionally, the
Court found that, while the teachers in Lemon might have had
difficulties resisting indoctrination, the facilities at issue in Tilton
were religiously neutral.4"
In Tilton, the Supreme Court established the ideological nature
of the institution receiving aid and the convertibility of that aid to
further religion as entanglement concerns. The Court struck
down the twenty-year limit, but remanded the case back to the
district court with the remainder of the statute intact.'
2. Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist
Two years after Lemon and Tilton, the Court considered Com-
mittee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,49 in-
volving a New York statute that authorized: (1) direct monetary
grants for physical maintenance of all school facilities, including
religious secondary and elementary schools; (2) tuition reim-
bursements to indigent parents of children attending private
schools; and (3) certain state tax exemptions to parents who did
not qualify for the tuition reimbursement. °
Applying Lemon, the Court held that the three statutory
schemes had a secular legislative purpose--"preserving a healthy
and safe educational environment for all of its schoolchildren."51
The Court, however, found that all three statutory schemes had
the effect of advancing religion because all three involved direct
aid to religious institutions.5 2 The Court distinguished the main-
tenance aid in Nyquist from the similar aid in Everson on the di-
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id. (The entanglement between church and state is also lessened here by the
nonideological character of the aid that the Government provides.").
48. Id. at 689.
49. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
50. See id. at 762-68.
51 Id. at 773.
52. See id. at 774-94.
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rect aid point. Here, the direct aid would finance the maintenance
of the building for both secular and sacred functions.53
3. Meek v. Pittenger
In Meek v. Pittenger,54 the Court invalidated a pair of Pennsyl-
vania statutes granting equipment loans and the use of public
personnel for student counseling and remedial education services
to religious primary and secondary schools. 5 The Court held that
the equipment loans failed the second prong of the Lemon test be-
cause of "the predominately religious character of the schools
benefiting from the Act."56 Unlike the general public welfare
services approved in Everson, the Court held that the equipment
loans were "neither indirect nor incidental."57 The Court was con-
cerned that substantial amounts of direct aid to the school, al-
though earmarked for secular purposes and not having any re-
ligious content per se, would inevitably aid religious functions.58
The Court noted that when "faced with the substantial
amounts of direct support authorized by Act 195, it would simply
ignore reality to attempt to separate secular educational func-
tions from the predominately religious role performed by many of
Pennsylvania's church-related elementary and secondary
schools."59 The Court went on to say that
the very purpose of many of those schools is to provide an integrated
secular and religious education; the teaching process is, to a large ex-
tent, devoted to the inculcation of religious values and belief....
Substantial aid to the educational function of such schools, accord-
ingly, necessarily results in aid to the sectarian school enterprise as a
whole.6"
"For this reason," the Court concluded, "Act 195's direct aid...
inescapably results in the direct and substantial advancement of
53. See id. at 774-80. "If the State may not erect buildings in which religious activi-
ties are to take place, it may not maintain such buildings or renovate them when they fall
into disrepair." Id. at 777.
54. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
55. Id. at 366.
56. Id. at 363.
57. Id. at 365.
58. See id. at 365-66.
59. Id. at 365 (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 366 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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religious activity... and thus constitutes an impermissible es-
tablishment of religion."6'
The Court refused to decide whether the auxiliary services also
constituted an impermissible advancement of religion.62 Instead,
the Court held that the prophylactic measures used to ensure
that such personnel would not invoke religion amounted to exces-
sive entanglement under the Lemon test.6" "[A] state subsidized
guidance counselor is surely as likely as a state-subsidized
chemistry teacher to fail on occasion to separate religious instruc-
tion.., from his secular educational responsibilities."6' In this re-
spect, the Court failed to distinguish between the urges of in-
structors employed by religious institutions and those employed
by the state.
The Meek decision established that potentially secular aid
would almost always be used for religious purposes in institutions
primarily dedicated to further sectarian ends. Substantial direct
aid to such institutions, therefore, has the undeniable effect of
advancing religion, even when the aid itself does not contain a
religious message. According to the decision in Meek, the Court
will examine both the nature of the institution to which the aid is
provided and whether the aid is direct or indirect.65 Direct aid is
per se unconstitutional when it goes to institutions that so inter-
twine sectarian and secular functions as to make them indistin-
guishable.66 Indirect aid to institutions that are not so permeated
by religion, however, will be upheld.6"
61. Id. (citations omitted).
62. Id. at 369.
63. See id. at 370 ("[E]xcessive entanglement would be required for Pennsylvania to
be 'certain,' as it must be, that... personnel do not advance the religious mission of the
church-related schools in which they serve.").
64. Id. at 371.
65. See id. at 368-69.
66. See id. at 363.
67. See id. at 359. The Court reaffirmed this principle the following term in Roemer v.
Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976). In Roemer, the Court upheld direct monetary aid
to religious universities. See id. at 754-61. The Court specifically relied upon the holding
in Tilton that the presumption of religious indoctrination applies with little force to relig-
iously affiliated institutions whose primary purpose is to foster secular education. See id.
Therefore, the direct aid was not going to a pervasively sectarian institution. See id.
2001]
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4. Larkin v. Grendel's Den
In Larkin v. Grendel's Den,68 an eight-to-one decision, the Court
invalidated a Massachusetts statute granting churches the right
to veto an application for a liquor license by any establishment lo-
cated within a 500-foot radius.69 The Court held that the statute
violated all three prongs of the Lemon test.7 ° Massachusetts ar-
gued that the statute served secular zoning purposes.7 The Court
held, however, that Massachusetts could have accomplished this
goal through means that did not delegate the decision to religious
authorities. 2 The Court, therefore, denied the validity of Massa-
chusetts's proffered secular purpose. Such a delegation necessar-
ily advances religion by allowing it to directly control the imple-
mentation of government policy. The statute also contained a
clear example of religious entanglement in government by "vest-
ing significant governmental authority in churches."73
According to the Court, this was a paradigmatic example of the
fusion of government and religion that the Establishment Clause
was designed to prevent.74 "The Framers did not set up a system
of government in which important, discretionary governmental
powers would be delegated to or shared with religious institu-
tions."75 The overwhelming majority decision and the abrupt tone
of the opinion indicated that the Court would not look kindly on
such blatant attempts to vest government power in religious
authorities.
D. The Rise of Private Choice Principles in "Effects" Analysis
1. Mueller v. Allen
In Mueller v. Allen,76 the Court upheld a Minnesota statute
that granted a state tax deduction to parents for their children's
68. 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
69. Id. at 117.
70. See id. at 127.
71. Id. at 120-21.
72. See id. at 122.
73. Id. at 126.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 127.
76. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
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educational expenses. The deduction applied to parents of both
public and non-public school students." It exempted a variety of
expenses ranging from tuition to tutoring costs to physical educa-
tion requirements.7' Basically, any money spent on education-
related activities by any parent was deductible for state tax pur-
poses.79 The statute prohibited the deduction for religious ex-
penses.8 o
The Court wasted little time in concluding that Minnesota's
goal served a secular purpose, as required under the first prong of
the Lemon test.8 ' As to the "effects" prong, the Court concluded
that the benefits to religion more closely resemble those permit-
ted under the Establishment Clause (i.e., Everson) than those
prohibited (i.e., Nyquist).82 For the first time in a government as-
sistance-to-religion case, the Court relied upon principles of indi-
vidual private choice to justify the conclusion that the state prac-
tice did not advance religion.' The statutory scheme benefited
the individual, not religion. The individual's choice, not the gov-
ernment's decision to fund, put the aid to religious use.
[B]y channeling whatever assistance it may provide to parochial
schools through individual parents .... Minnesota's arrangement [of]
public funds become[s] available only as a result of numerous private
choices of individual parents of school-age children.... Where, as
here, aid to parochial schools is available only as a result of decisions
of individual parents no "imprimatur of state approval,"... can be
deemed on any particular religion or on religion in general.84
Finally, the Court concluded that the statute does not exces-
sively entangle government with religion, even though the deduc-
tion did not apply to religious books or materials.8 5 The state can
determine whether certain expenses are secular without resorting
to an invasive system of government surveillance.86
77. Id. at 397.
78. Id. at 390 n.1.
79. See id. at 391-92 n.2.
80. Id. at 390 n.1.
81 See id. at 394-95.
82. Id. at 398.
83. See id. at 397-99.
84. Id. at 399 (emphasis added) (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274
(1981)).
85. Id. at 403.
86. See id.
20011
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2. Bowen v. Kendrick
In Bowen v. Kendrick, 7 the Court denied a facial Establish-
ment Clause-based challenge to certain provisions of the Adoles-
cent Family Life Act of 1981 ("AFLA"). The challenged provi-
sions authorized federal monetary grants to organizations
implementing programs with the purpose of curbing teenage
pregnancy. 9 A particular provision explicitly stated that grant
implementation should involve a broad range of organizations,
including religious institutions.9" The AFLA imposes several limi-
tations on the use of its grant funds, including: (1) a ban on the
use of funds for family planning services; (2) a ban on grants to
institutions who provide abortions, abortion counseling, or abor-
tion referral; and (3) a ban on the use of funds for projects or pro-
grams advocating the use of abortion.9
The Court held that Congress's inclusion of religious organiza-
tions in its statutory scheme does not endorse a non-secular pur-
pose.9 2 Reducing teenage pregnancy is the goal of the AFLA.9 In-
cluding religious organizations in the task simply represents a
legitimate congressional "aim of increasing broadbased commu-
nity involvement 'in helping adolescent boys and girls understand
the implications of premarital sexual relations, pregnancy, and
parenthood."'94
The Court's decision explicitly recognized the connection be-
tween direct aid to pervasively sectarian institutions and the use
of funds for religious purposes under the "effects" prong of the
Lemon test.95 While the AFLA does not contain limitations on the
use of funds for religious purposes, there is nothing in the statute
87. 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
88. Id. at 593; 42 U.S.C. § 300z (1994). One of the goals of the AFLA is "to help adoles-
cents and their families deal with complex issues of adolescent premarital sexual relations
and the consequences of such relations." 42 U.S.C. § 300z(a)(10)(C).
89. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 593; 42 U.S.C. § 300z-2.
90. See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 595-96; 42 U.S.C. § 300z(a)(8)(B).
91. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 596-97.
92. Id. at 602-04.
93. See id. at 604-05.
94. Id. at 603 (quoting S. REP. No. 97-161 at 15-16 (1981)).
95. Id. at 610 ("Accordingly, a relevant factor in deciding whether a particular statute
on its face can be said to have the improper effect of advancing religion is the determina-
tion of whether, and to what extent, the statute directs government aid to pervasively sec-
tarian institutions.").
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to indicate that religious uses are permitted.9" The Court, there-
fore, refused to hold that the statute specifically earmarked aid
for pervasively sectarian institutions.
The Court held that there was insufficient entanglement be-
tween government and religion to justify overturning the stat-
ute.98 The school-funding cases make clear that aid to pervasively
sectarian institutions requires a degree of oversight that violates
the third prong of the Lemon test.99 Without explanation, the
Court concluded, however, that "there is no reason to assume that
the religious organizations which may receive grants are 'perva-
sively sectarian' in the same sense as the Court has held paro-
chial schools to be."'00
The Bowen decision left open the possibility that the statute, as
applied, could violate the Establishment Clause. The Court re-
manded the case for a fact-specific determination as to whether
the AFLA, in operation, gave direct aid to pervasively sectarian
institutions.'0 ' The use of grants to produce "materials that have
an explicitly religious content or are designed to inculcate the
views of a particular religious faith" would impermissibly ad-
vance religion.'0 2 However, "evidence that the views espoused on
questions such as premarital sex, abortion, and the like hap-
pen[ed] to coincide with the religious views of the AFLA grantee
would not be sufficient to show that the grant funds [were] being
used.., to have a primary effect of advancing religion." °8
The Bowen decision illustrates the Court's reluctance to strike
down a statute on its face without factual evidence indicating an
impermissible use of direct aid for religious purposes. Still, the
Court has held that direct aid to pervasively sectarian institu-
tions violates both the "effects" and "entanglement" prongs of the
Lemon test.'0 4 Outside the context of parochial school aid, how-
96. Id. at 614.
97. See id. at 610.
98. See id. at 616 ("There is accordingly no reason to fear that the less intensive moni-
toring involved here will cause the Government to intrude unduly in the day-to-day opera-
tion of the religiously affiliated AFLA grantees.").
99. See discussion supra Part II.C.
100. Id.
101 Id. at 620-22.
102. Id. at 621.
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 409 (1985); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S.
2001]
326 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:313
ever, the Court will likely require a factual record indicating the
pervasively sectarian nature of institutions receiving direct gov-
ernment aid in order to justify fashioning an appropriate remedy.
3. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District
In Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District,'0 5 the Court
held that a public school district would not violate the Establish-
ment Clause by providing a sign-language interpreter to a deaf
student attending a parochial school.' The Catalina Foothills
School District refused James Zobrest's request under the Indi-
viduals with Disabilities in Education Act ("IDEA7)' °7 on the
ground that such action would violate the Establishment
Clause.' °
The Court, once again, invoked the principle of private choice,
holding that this type of indirect aid to religion would not violate
the Establishment Clause.0 9 The government benefit was avail-
able, under the IDEA, to all hearing-impaired students regardless
of whether they attended a public or religious school." ° Zobrest's
choice, not government action, dictated where the sign-language
interpreter performed."' "In other words, because the IDEA cre-
ates no financial incentive for parents to choose a sectarian
school, an interpreter's presence there cannot be attributed to
state decisionmaking.""'
The Zobrest decision is important for our purposes because it
entrenched three points in the aid-to-religion cases. First, unlike
previously invalidated programs in Meek and School District of
Grand Rapids v. Ball,"' the aid to Zobrest simply supplemented
734, 743 (1973).
105. 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
106. Id. at 14.
107. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1489 (1994).
108. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 3.
109. See id. at 10-11.
110. Id. at 10.
111. Id. at 10-11.
112. Id. at 10.
113. 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (invalidating a program employing public employees as teach-
ers of secular subjects in parochial schools as having the effect of advancing religion based
on three assumptions: (i) any public employee who works on the premises of a religious
school will inculcate religious values; (ii) the presence of public employees on the campuses
of religious schools creates a symbolic union between government and religion; and (iii) all
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costs to the sectarian institution. 4 The statutory schemes in
those cases specifically sought to supplant costs that the religious
schools would have otherwise borne in fulfilling their state-
mandated minimal education requirements." 5 Second, in Zobrest,
the aid recipient was identified by his handicap, not by his relig-
ion." 6 Any deaf child may receive aid. The statutes in Meek and
the education programs in Ball imposed benefits primarily upon
religious institutions." Third, the aid to Zobrest was indirect in
that the handicapped child, not the religious school, received the
aid.11
8
Additionally, publicly employed sign-language interpreters do
not provoke the same danger of religious inculcation as teachers
employed by parochial schools." 9 Sign-language interpreters sim-
ply translate word-for-word the speech of students and teach-
ers. 20 "The sign-language interpreter they have requested will
neither add to nor subtract from that environment, and hence the
provision of such assistance is not barred by the Establishment
Clause."' 2 '
E. The Reformulation of the Lemon Test: Agostini v. Felton and a
New Age of Establishment Clause Jurisprudence
Recognizing the crucial change that private choice principles
inflicted upon Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the Court
seized the opportunity to abandon previous decisions in Ball and
its companion case Aguilar v. Felton,22 in Agostini v. Felton."2
Agostini was, in fact, an extension of Aguilar. In Aguilar, the
Court invalidated a portion of Title I of the Elementary and Sec-
direct public aid to religious schools invariably aids the sectarian functions of that school).
114. See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 12.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Ball, 473 U.S. at 375; Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 351 (1975).
118. See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10 ("[Under the IDEA, no funds traceable to the govern-
ment ever find their way into the sectarian schools' coffers. The only indirect economic
benefit a sectarian school might receive by dint of the DEA is the disabled child's tui-
tion.").
119. See id. at 13.
120. See id.
12L Id.
122. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
123. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
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ondary Education Act of 1965,124 which authorized public teachers
to provide remedial instruction at parochial schools.125 In accor-
dance with that decision, the district court in Agostini issued a
permanent injunction against operation of the statute.126 In 1995,
the petitioners filed motions under Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 60(b)(5) for relief from the permanent injunction.12 They
alleged that the decisional law had dramatically changed so as to
invalidate the injunction.12
Justice O'Connor wrote a detailed opinion granting the motion
to vacate. 2 9 According to Justice O'Connor, the student's decision
to attend a religious school invalidated the presumption that di-
rect aid to a religious school's educational mission is impermissi-
ble. 3 ' In particular, the Court relied upon Zobrest to explicitly
reject the presumptions in Meek and Ball that the mere presence
of public employees at religious schools will: (1) result in govern-
ment indoctrination of religion; and (2) inevitably result in a
symbolic union of church and state.'3 ' Using this analysis, the
Court held that New York's Title I program "is indistinguishable
from the provision of sign-language interpreters under the IDEA.
Both programs make aid available only to eligible recipients.
That aid is provided to students at whatever school they choose to
attend."13 2
The Agostini decision explicitly recognizes that the criteria
used to ascertain aid eligibility are important for two reasons.
First, they determine whether any religious indoctrination is at-
tributable to the State.'33 Second, they determine whether the aid
creates an incentive to undergo religious indoctrination. 134 When
eligibility for aid depends on secular conditions that neither favor
nor disfavor religion, neither of these concerns is implicated.
135
124. 20 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2971 (repealed 1982).
125. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 414.
126. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 212.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 208-15.
129. Id. at 240.
130. See id. at 226.
131. See id. at 225-27.
132. Id. at 228.
133. Id. at 230.
134. Id. at 231.
135. Id.
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New York's Title I program allocated aid to schools based on an
individual student's eligibility, determined by clearly secular
standards. 3 ' The Court held that the aid neither resulted in gov-
ernment indoctrination of religion, nor created a financial incen-
tive to undergo such a process. 1 The program, therefore, did not
have the effect of advancing religion. 3 '
Justice O'Connor restated the Lemon test as a two-prong in-
quiry with the issue of excessive entanglement as one of three
relevant factors in determining whether the statute has the effect
of advancing religion.'39 In making an "effects" analysis of gov-
ernment aid, the Court will determine whether: (1) the govern-
ment action results in governmental indoctrination of religion; (2)
the government aid defines its recipients by religion; and (3) the
statutory scheme involves excessive entanglement between gov-
ernment and religion. 4 ' Administrative cooperation and political
divisiveness are no longer sufficient, in and of themselves, to jus-
tify a finding of excessive entanglement.' The monitoring system
used in Agostini to ensure that public teachers refrained from in-
doctrinating religion was not sufficient to deem it a system of con-
tinuous and pervasive surveillance of religion.
III. MITCHELL V. HELMS AND ITS EFFECT ON DIRECT AID
ANALYSIS
A. Facts and Procedural History
Chapter 2 of the Education Consolidation and Improvement
Act of 1981' authorizes block grants of federal money to local
educational agencies ("LEAs").' 4 These agencies use the aid to
purchase educational materials that are distributed to primary
136. Id. at 232.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See id. at 232-33.
140. See id. at 232.
14L See id. at 233-34.
142. See id.
143. 20 U.S.C. §§ 7301-7373 (1994).
144. See id. § 7312.
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and secondary schools.'45 Chapter 2 provides that the LEAs must
distribute the goods to both public and private schools based on
the number of students attending individual schools.'6 Several
restrictions apply to private school grants.'47 First, Chapter 2 aid
can only be used to supplement, not support, any private
school.' Second, LEAs must retain legal title to any equipment
purchased with Chapter 2 funds.'49 Third, no private school may
control Chapter 2 funds. 5 ° The LEA for Jefferson Parish, Louisi-
ana, used its Chapter 2 allocations for library and media pur-
chases, such as library books, computers, VCRs, TVs, and projec-
tion screens.' 5'
In 1985, the respondents in Mitchell initiated an action in the
Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana,'52
alleging that Chapter 2 aid to private religious schools in Jeffer-
son Parish violated the Establishment Clause. 5  After several
pretrial and posttrial motions, the district court granted judg-
ment for the Jefferson Parish LEA.'54 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit
reversed, holding that Chapter 2 aid to private schools in Jeffer-
son Parish had the effect of advancing religion. 5 5 Thereafter, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.'56
B. Justice Thomas's Opinion
Justice Thomas, writing for the plurality, began by acknowl-
edging that Agostini significantly modified the Lemon test.57 Be-
cause the respondent challengers failed to dispute Chapter 2's
secular purpose before the Fifth Circuit, the Court refused to ad-
145. See id. § 7351 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
146. See id. § 7312(a)-(b) (1994).
147. See id. § 7372.
148. See id. § 7372(a)(1).
149. See id. § 7372(c)(1).
150. Id.
151. See Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530, 2537-38 (2000) (plurality opinion).
152. Id. at 2538.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 2539-40.
156. 527 U.S. 1002 (1999).
157. See Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2532. Justice Thomas's plurality opinion was joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, along with Justices Scalia and Kennedy.
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dress that argument.'55 Instead, Justice Thomas dedicated his
opinion to applying the new post-Agostini "effects" test.'59 He con-
cluded that Chapter 2 aid to private schools in Jefferson Parish
did not have the effect of advancing religion.
160
1. Government Indoctrination of Religion
Relying upon the holdings in Witters v. Washington Depart-
ment of Services for the Blind,'6' Mueller v. Allen,'62 and Zo-
brest,"'63 Justice Thomas combined the secular criteria discussion
from Agostini with the Court's private choice principles and con-
cluded that no religious indoctrination which occurs at private
schools in Jefferson Parish can be attributed to the government
aid under Chapter 2."6 According to Justice Thomas:
In distinguishing between indoctrination that is attributable to
the State and indoctrination that is not, we have consistently turned
to the principle of neutrality, upholding aid that is offered to a broad
range of groups or persons without regard to their religion. If the re-
ligious, irreligious, and areligious were all alike eligible for govern-
mental aid, no one would conclude that any indoctrination that any
particular recipient conducts has been done at the behest of the gov-
ernment....
As a way of assuring neutrality, we have repeatedly considered
whether any governmental aid that goes to a religious institution
does so "only as a result of genuinely independent and private
choices of individuals."
165
The amount of aid distributed under Chapter 2 is determined
on the basis of how many students attend the school.166 The state
does not participate in a student's decision to attend a religious
school.'67 If the aid is distributed according to this decision, then
any indoctrination of religion that occurs, results from the stu-
158. Id. at 2540.
159. See id. at 2541.
160. Id. at 2552.
161. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
162. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
163. See supra Part ll.D.3.
1646 Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2552.
165. Id. at 2541 (emphasis added) (quotingAgostini, 521 U.S. at 226).
166. See 20 U.S.C. § 7312(a)-(b) (1994).
167. Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2542.
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dent's decision instead of the state's aid.' Like the sign-language
interpreter in Zobrest, or the tax exemption in Mueller, any aid to
the religious mission, like the corresponding aid to the nonrelig-
ious schools, is attributable to the private choices of the individu-
als and not to state action.
6 9
2. Chapter 2 Does Not Define its Recipients by Religion
Justice Thomas invoked formal neutrality theory to support his
finding that Chapter 2 does not define its recipients by religion. °
According to the plurality, if aid is distributed equally to both re-
ligious and public schools, the student will receive the same bene-
fit no matter where he/she attends school.'' "For to say that a
program does not create an incentive to choose religious schools is
to say that the private choice is truly 'independent.''7 2 Thus,
Chapter 2 does not define its beneficiaries by religion.
3
The plurality went so far as to say that even if Chapter 2 low-
ers the cost of obtaining a religious education, this still does not
create a financial incentive sufficient to justify a finding that
Chapter 2 recipients are identified by their religion. 74 Yet, the
plurality failed to explain how this is not a financial incentive or
how it would not frustrate the independent nature of the neutral
distribution mechanism.
168. See id. at 2543 ("We explained that 'where, as here, aid to parochial schools is
available only as a result of decisions of individual parents no "imprimatur of state ap-
proval" can be deemed to have been conferred on any particular religion, or on religion
generally.'") (quoting Mueller, 463 U.S. at 397).
169. See id.
170. See id. at 2541.
171. See id.
172. Id. at 2543 (citing Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S.
481, 486 (1986)).
173. Id.
174. See id. at 2543-44.
We hasten to add, what should be obvious from the rule itself, that simply
because an aid program offers private schools, and thus religious schools, a
benefit that they did not previously receive does not mean that the program,
by reducing the cost of securing a religious education, creates, under Agos-
tini's second criterion, an "incentive" for parents to choose such an education
for their children. For any aid will have some effect.
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3. The Revolution: Direct, Non-incidental Aid Does Not Violate
the Establishment Clause if Distributed Neutrally
Justice Thomas explicitly rejected the respondents' contention
that any direct, non-incidental aid to religion, such as Chapter 2,
violates the Establishment Clause.7 5 These programs are permis-
sible so long as the government distributes aid in a neutral man-
ner, in accordance with the private choices of individuals. 176
If aid to schools, even "direct aid," is neutrally available and, before
reaching or benefitting any religious school, first passes through the
hands (literally or figuratively) of numerous private citizens who are
free to direct the aid elsewhere, the government has not provided
any "support of religion." Although the presence of private choice is
easier to see when aid literally passes through the hands of indi-
viduals-which is why we mentioned directness in the same breath
with private choice... there is no reason why the Establishment
Clause requires such a form.'
77
Direct aid situations, therefore, do not raise heightened con-
cern where the distribution of aid is determined based upon crite-
ria that are religiously neutral and reflect private choices. 7 Ag-
ostini marked the death of the direct/indirect aid distinction when
it voided Ball's rule "that all government aid that directly assists
the educational function of religious schools is invalid."79 Direct
monetary grants will still raise important Establishment Clause
concerns. 8 ' The Mitchell case, however, involved direct equip-
ment loans, not monetary grants to religious institutions. 8'
Justice Thomas dismissed any rule that would inquire as to the
divertibility of direct aid to religious schools.'82 No aid, whether
direct or indirect, may take the form of religious materials.'83 If
there is no religious content, and the aid is distributed neutrally,
"Cany use of that aid to indoctrinate cannot be attributed to the
175. Id. at 2547.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 2544-45 (citations omitted).
178. See id.
179. Id. at 2545 (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 225 (1997)).
180. See id. at 2546.
18L See id. at 2545-46.
182. Id. at 2547.
183. See id.
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government and is thus not of constitutional concern."'" Nor can
the use of that aid create an impermissible incentive. 8 5 There is a
distinct difference between the use of government aid to indoctri-
nate religion and religious indoctrination by the government or
incentives created by government aid.'86
For the plurality, the issue was not divertibility of aid, but
rather impermissible content.' 7 If the content of the aid is per-
missible in the context of a public school, then it automatically
qualifies in the parochial school context.' Like a sign-language
interpreter, there is no content in the aid provided under Chapter
2.'89 A computer screen or overhead projector has no ability to in-
culcate a religious message, unless the operator uses it for such
purposes.' 90 Under those circumstances, the aid only conveys the
religious message.' 9' The religious school accomplishes the indoc-
trination, not the aid.' 92 A divertibility rule would be unworkable
"because it is boundless-enveloping all aid, no matter how triv-
ial-and thus has only the most attenuated (if any) link to any
realistic concern for preventing an 'establishment of religion. " '9'
Finally, Justice Thomas abandoned years of established prece-
dent in boldly announcing that aid to pervasively sectarian insti-
tutions raises no special Establishment Clause concerns.' 94 He
proffered four reasons for this conclusion. First, recent precedent
proves that an institution's sectarian nature is no longer rele-
vant.' 95 Second, if the recipient furthers a secular purpose, then
the sectarian nature of that institution is not relevant in a consti-
tutional analysis.'96 Third, the Court should refuse to examine
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See id. ("[W]e did not, as respondents do, think that the use of governmental aid to
further religious indoctrination was synonymous with religious indoctrination by the gov-
ernment or that such use of aid created any improper incentives.").
187. Id.
188. Id. at 2548.
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. Id.
192. See id. at 2548-49.
193. Id. at 2549.
194. See id. at 2552. 'The dissent is correct that there was a period when this factor
mattered.... But that period is one that the Court should regret, and it is thankfully long
past." Id. at 2550 (citations omitted).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 2551.
WIELDING THE AX OF NEUTRALITY
matters of conscience, such as the nature of an individual or insti-
tution's beliefs.'97 Finally, the pervasively sectarian standard
demonstrates open hostility to religion, most particularly to the
Catholic religion.19
4. Applying the New Standard to Chapter 2
Justice Thomas concluded that because Chapter 2 determines
eligibility of government aid neutrally, based on the private
choices of parents, it does not define its recipients by religion and
does not have any impermissible content.' There is evidence
that the equipment has, or could possibly be, put to use as a tool
of religious indoctrination.20 That, however, has no relevance to
an effects analysis.20 ' The procedural safeguards in Chapter 2-
requiring that the equipment remain the legal property of the
state and that it be used for secular and nonideological
purposes-mitigate any concerns that the aid might be used for
sectarian purposes.0 2 The Court did not address the issue of
excessive entanglement because neither party challenged the
Fifth Circuit's holding that Chapter 2 does not involve excessive
entanglement.0 3
The plurality concluded that Chapter 2 aid to religious schools
in Jefferson Parish "does not have the effect of advancing relig-
ion.20 4 The plurality overruled Meek and its presumptions as to
direct aid to pervasively sectarian institutions.2 5
C. Justice O'Connor's Concurring Opinion
1. Rejecting Blind Deference to Neutrality
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Breyer, agreed with the
197. Id.
198. See id.
199. See id. at 2552.
200. See id. at 2553.
20L See id. at 2554.
202. See id. at 2553-54.
203. See id. at 2540.
204. Id. at 2555.
205. See id. at 2555-56.
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plurality that Chapter 2, in practice, does not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause because it does not have the effect of advancing
religion.20 6 Justice O'Connor, however, vehemently disagreed with
the mode of analysis that the plurality used to come to this con-
clusion. °7
I write separately because, in my view, the plurality announces a
rule of unprecedented breadth for the evaluation of Establishment
Clause challenges to government school-aid programs. Reduced to its
essentials, the plurality's rule states that government aid to religious
schools does not have the effect of advancing religion so long as the
aid is offered on a neutral basis and the aid is secular in content. The
plurality also rejects the distinction between direct and indirect aid,
and holds that the actual diversion of secular aid by a religious
school to the advancement of its religious mission is permissible.
The concurring faction objected specifically to the plurality's
blind deference to the principle of formal neutrality2 9 and its lack
of concern over actual diversion of government aid for religious
indoctrination.2 10 Justice O'Connor did not dispute the recognition
of neutrality as an important consideration in deciding Estab-
lishment Clause aid cases. 1 ' She did, however, find it disturbing
that the plurality intended to elevate that principle from one of
many concerns to the decisive factor. 21 2 "[W]e have never held
that a government-aid program passes constitutional muster
solely because of the neutral criteria it employs as a basis for dis-
tributing aid."
213
As to actual diversion, Justice O'Connor flatly stated that the
plurality was wrong in analogizing Zobrest and Witters to Chap-
206. See id. at 2556 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
207. See id.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 2558
First, the plurality's treatment of neutrality comes close to assigning that fac-
tor singular importance in the future adjudication of Establishment Clause
challenges to government school-aid programs. Second, the plurality's ap-
proval of actual diversion of government aid to religious indoctrination is in
tension with our precedents and, in any event, unnecessary to decide the in-
stant case.
2556
See id. at 2557.
See id.
Id.
208.
209.
210.
Id. at
211.
212.
213.
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ter 2.214 In those cases, the statutory schemes provided aid di-
rectly to the student who, in turn, directed its usage according to
his or her own private choices.215 Under Chapter 2, the student
makes the choice and then the aid is provided to the school based
on a per capita student formula.216 The reasons for tolerating di-
vertibility when the student controls the aid are absent under a
per capita distribution system.217 First, in Witters and Zobrest, the
aid was wholly dependent on the student's choice.2"' Second, a
reasonable observer could perceive a per capita distribution sys-
tem as a government endorsement of religious education when
the aid is diverted to religious purposes.219
The distinction between a true private choice situation and a
per capita distribution system takes on special importance in the
context of direct aid cases.220 Any government aid that is distrib-
uted to religion would be upheld under the plurality's analysis so
long as it has a public sector counterpart. 22' "And, because actual
diversion is permissible... the participating religious organiza-
tions (including churches) could use that aid to support religious
indoctrination."222
2. Resurrecting Neutrality: Applying Agostini to Chapter 2
Justice O'Connor went on to apply Agostini to Chapter 2.23 She
concluded that because Chapter 2 provides aid in a neutral man-
ner, it does not define its recipients by religion.224 By distributing
aid neutrally, Chapter 2 does not create a financial incentive to
undertake religious indoctrination.225
214. See id. at 2558.
215. See id. Justice O'Connor stated that "[t]hose decisions, however, rested on a sig-
nificant factual premise missing from this case .... Specifically, we decided Witters and
Zobrest on the understanding that the aid was provided directly to the individual student
who, in turn, made the choice of where to put that aid to use." Id.
216. See id. at 2559.
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See id. at 2552-53.
222. Id. at 2560.
223. See id.
224. See id. at 2561.
225. See id.
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Agostini required the Court to determine whether the govern-
ment aid in question results in religious indoctrination. 6 Justice
O'Connor recognized that Agostini effectively denied the validity
of the presumptions in Meek that: (1) government aid to parochial
schools inevitably results in the impermissible effect of a symbolic
union between government and religion;227 and (2) direct aid to
the educational functions of religious schools necessarily aids the
religious mission of those schools.228 While direct monetary aid to
religious institutions still raises suspicion, there is no reason to
apply the same cynicism to clearly secular aid.229 "To establish a
First Amendment violation, plaintiffs must prove that the aid in
question actually is, or has been, used for religious purposes." "0
There are numerous factors that drove Justice O'Connor to
conclude that the aid from Chapter 2 does not result in govern-
ment indoctrination. First, aid is distributed neutrally, based on
secular standards.23' Second, the funds may only supplement the
educational mission of the religious schools.2 32 Third, no Chapter
2 funds are ever deposited with the religious schools."3 Fourth,
the statute requires that all Chapter 2 materials distributed to
religious schools must be secular and nonideological. 234 Finally,
any diversion of aid to religious purposes is, at best, de mini-
mis.238 Justice O'Connor concluded that there was insufficient fac-
tual evidence in the record to prove actual diversion of Chapter 2
aid for religious purposes.2" 6 The program's safeguards are consti-
tutionally sufficient to ensure compliance with the Establishment
Clause.237 Inadvertent and infrequent violations of the statutory
limitations of Chapter 2 aid are insufficient to warrant an invali-
dation of the entire statutory scheme as applied to private relig-
ious schools. 2
38
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. See id. at 2561-62.
229. See id. at 2566.
230. Id. at 2567.
231. See id. at 2562.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 2569.
238. Id.
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D. Justice Souter's Dissenting Opinion
1. The Protections and Foundations of the Establishment Clause
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, con-
cluded that Chapter 2 has the effect of advancing religion." 9 He,
therefore, dissented from the Court's judgment to the contrary.20
For the dissenters, deciding Establishment Clause cases based on
neutrality frustrates the original purposes behind that constitu-
tional mandate.24
The Establishment Clause protects against several encroach-
ments by the government. It protects the right of the individual's
freedom of conscience in matters of ultimate concern against ma-
nipulation by the government. 2 It also protects the integrity and
purity of religious institutions from the same danger.' Finally,
the Establishment Clause protects our society at large from the
divisive and exclusionary "antagonism of controversy over public
support for religious causes.'
Justice Souter concluded that there are three philosophical
foundations for the Establishment Clause.245 First, government
aid of religion violates an individual's freedom of conscience by
compelling him or her to support religious views with which he or
she disagrees.' "Second, government aid corrupts religion."'
Third, government aid of sectarian institutions unavoidably re-
sults in conflict.2'
2. The Principles of Establishment Clause Jurisprudence
The dissent concluded that the basic principles underlying the
Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence make it clear that,
239. Id. at 2595 (Souter, J., dissenting).
240. See id. at 2597.
241. Id. at 2573.
242. See id. at 2572.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 2574.
246. See id.
247. Id.
248. See id. at 2575.
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at the very least, tax revenue may not be used to support a relig-
ious school or religious teaching. 49 The government, however,
does not violate this principle when it provides universally avail-
able welfare benefits to religious institutions. ° The line between
government aid and universally available welfare is not precise.25'
There is, however, no rule that constitutionalizes any benefit be-
stowed upon religious students simply because their public school
counterparts are privy to an identical endowment.2 5 Instead, Es-
tablishment Clause neutrality dictates that the government may
not aid or inhibit religion.253 This form of neutrality does not
mean that even distribution of benefits between religious and
nonreligious institutions equates to constitutionally valid aid to
religion. 4
According to Justice Souter, neutrality, as the plurality con-
ceived of it, is flawed as a guiding principle for judging govern-
ment aid cases. The plurality transformed the definition of neu-
trality from a principle of "equipoise between government as an
ally and government as adversary," to a standard of "evenhand-
edness."2 55 The plurality's version of "neutrality" is flawed be-
cause it fails to address three areas of primary concern: (1) the
characteristics of the aid recipient; (2) the aid distribution
method; and (3) the characteristics of the aid itself.25 6
Formal neutrality fails to acknowledge the unique characteris-
tics of the institutions receiving aid. Government donations to
pervasively sectarian institutions, like primary and secondary
religious schools, raise special concerns.257 Direct subsidies to
these institutions are prohibited because they will inevitably
support religious indoctrination, even when the content of the aid
is religiously neutral.25
Blind deference to neutrality fails to address the method of dis-
249. See id. at 2575-76.
250. See id. at 2577.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 2580.
256. See id. at 2582.
257. See id. at 2583.
258. See id. at 2582-83.
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tribution. 259 The plurality explicitly rejected the relevance of the
direct/indirect aid distinction. "Direct aid obviously raises greater
risks, although recent cases have discounted this risk factor,
looking to other features of the distribution mechanism."26" The
Court has distinguished between aid that flows only indirectly
and incidentally to religious schools and "aid that is in reality di-
rected to religious schools by the government or in practical terms
selected by religious schools themselves."26'
Other very important concerns apply in government aid to re-
ligion cases, even when neither the recipient, nor the manner of
distribution is defective. The Establishment Clause prohibits the
aid from possessing a religious content.262 That is, aid may not
take the form of, for example, religious materials or textbooks for
inculcating religious thought. For the same reasons, aid is also
invalid if there is a substantial risk that it will be diverted to re-
ligious uses.263 Direct monetary grants to a religious organiza-
tion's treasury raise special divertibility concerns. "Divertibility is
not, of course, a characteristic of cash alone, and when examining
provisions for ostensibly secular supplies we have considered
their susceptibility to the service of religious ends."2 64 Aid that
supplants a large portion of the religious institution's budget is
constitutionally invalid. This type of aid frees up large portions of
the religious institution's budget permitting rededication of re-
sources toward religious indoctrination.265
Raising evenhandedness of distribution to the pinnacle of Es-
tablishment Clause analysis, as the plurality does, frustrates all
of the aforementioned concerns. The plurality's analysis eviscer-
ates the principles developed throughout the evolution of the
Lemon/Agostini "effects" analysis. Neutrality, as an end-all be-all
factor, permits any aid to religion so long as there is a corre-
sponding privilege to the religious institution's public sector coun-
terpart. The plurality assumes, without justification, that equal
259. See id. at 2584.
260. Id. at 2583.
261. Id. at 2584.
262. See id. (W]e have barred aid with actual religious content, which would obvi-
ously run afoul of the ban on the government's participation in religion.").
263. See id. at 2585 ("We have long held government aid invalid when circumstances
would allow its diversion to religious education.").
264. Id. at 2586.
265. See id. at 2589.
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distribution will have an equal effect on public perception and in-
centives that aid religion.2 6 This conception of neutrality elevates
a per capita distribution rule to the same status afforded to sys-
tems that involve legitimate individual private choice princi-
ples. According to Justice Souter, Chapter 2 aid to religious
schools in Jefferson Parish violated the Establishment Clause
under both Lemon and Agostini.268 The system of direct distribu-
tion of government aid in Jefferson Parish resulted in the actual
diversion of aid to religious indoctrination.2 9 "The type of aid, the
structure of the program, and the lack of effective safeguards
clearly demonstrate the divertibility of the aid. While little is
known about its use, owing to the anemic enforcement system in
the parish, even the thin record before us reveals that actual di-
version occurred."270 The program, therefore, had the effect of ad-
vancing religion and thus violated the Establishment Clause. 1
IV. CHARITABLE CHOICE
In 1996, former Republican Senator, and current United States
Attorney General, John Ashcroft of Missouri, introduced an inter-
esting amendment to the Welfare Reform ActY.27 His idea, known
now as Charitable Choice, permits state governments receiving
federal welfare grants to contract directly with religious institu-
tions providing social services in a religious setting.2
73
The following is a summary of the statute's relevant portions.
First, state governments may contract with religious institutions
to provide social services. 4 Second, state governments may set
up a redeemable voucher system for social services provided at
religious institutions,7 Third, no federal or state welfare pro-
266. See id. at 2590-91.
267. Id.
268. See id. at 2591-96.
269. See id. at 2595 ("But the record here goes beyond risk, to instances of actual diver-
sion.").
270. Id. at 2591.
271. See id. at 2596.
272. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-1397jj (Supp. IV 1994).
273. See Chris Collins, State Officials Will Soon Find Themselves Center in Legal De-
bate Over Roles of Church, State, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 24, 1997, available at
1997 WL 8843762.
274. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(a)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1998).
275. Id. § 604a(a)(1)(B).
WIELDING THE AX OF NEUTRALITY
gram is permitted to exclude religious organizations from partici-
pating in the these programs.2 6 Fourth, religious organizations
are not required to alter their sectarian nature in order to receive
a social services contract. 77 Fifth, religious organizations are still
exempt from federal anti-discrimination laws, even if they par-
ticipate in the provision of federally funded welfare programs. 8
Sixth, religious providers of social services are subject to the same
auditing requirements as their nonreligious counterparts. 2 9 Fi-
nally, no religious provider of social services will expend contract
funds to engage in "sectarian worship, instruction, or proselytiza-
tion."280
Ashcroft included a similar provision in the Health and Human
Services Reauthorization Act of 1998.281 There are at least five
major legislative schemes currently before Congress that include
direct government-aid-to-religion provisions similar to the origi-
nal Charitable Choice.282 Many states are looking to implement
similar schemes.' Charitable Choice has obvious political ap-
peal. Resolving the constitutionality of this type of direct aid pro-
gram, therefore, is of utmost relevance, for we will see more of
these programs proposed in the future.
A. Charitable Choice Does Not Have a Secular Purpose
When Ashcroft introduced the precursor bill that ended up be-
coming Charitable Choice, he indicated that the federal govern-
ment needed to involve religious organizations in providing wel-
fare services.' According to Ashcroft, a religious movement
around the turn of the century provided the impetus for imple-
276. Id. § 604a(c).
277. Id. § 604a(d)(1).
278. Id. § 604a(f).
279. Id. § 604a(h)(1).
280. Id. § 604a(j).
281 See Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Legislative Issues On-
line: Charitable Choice, at http://www.au.org/leg-issu.ht (last visited Apr. 21, 2001).
282. See id.
283. See Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Chart of Church/State
Legislation Passed by the States 1999 Legislative Session, at http'//www.au.org/st-
chart.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2001); see also Talking Points on "Charitable Choice,"
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, at http//www.au.org/ashcroft.htm
(last visited Mar. 26, 2001).
284. 141 CONG. REc. S7238 (daily ed. May 23, 1995) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft).
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menting government-subsidized welfare."' That movement came
to view poverty as the root of immorality." 6 The federal govern-
ment responded by enacting sweeping welfare provisions.8 7 By
doing so, however, the government monopolized the field."8 More
importantly, the government robbed the movement of its spiritual
element." 9 During the course of the government's failed experi-
ment in welfare, small religious organizations have continued on
a small-scale to provide services independently of the govern-
ment.29 ° These small-scale enterprises succeed where the gov-
ernment has failed, primarily because of their spiritual nature.2 91
As Ashcroft stated:
We have all heard the stories of small organizations that are hugely
successful in helping America's poor. Unfortunately, many of these
programs have been constrained from receiving Federal funds be-
cause all too often those Federal finds would require radical changes
in their beliefs, their structure, their facilities, their program, or
their organization-changes that would rob these programs of the
very characteristics and attitudes that make them successful.292
Ashcroft's statement demonstrates a belief that injecting a
spiritual element into social welfare services equates to successful
assistance. This is a clear government endorsement of religious
practice. Judging by the logic of these statements, the purpose of
the statutory scheme is not only to involve religious organiza-
tions, but also to integrate the religious character of those organi-
zations. One could argue that the religious character adds to the
effectiveness of such programs. This justification, however, still
includes religion in providing governmental services because of its
spiritual qualities. It is not presumptuous to infer that the gov-
ernment specifically endorses what is being said under such a
scenario.
The Court, however, has generally rejected the type of argu-
ment that involves analyzing isolated comments by individual
285. Id. at S7237.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 87238.
291. Id.
292. Id.; see also Stephen V. Monsma, The "Pervasively Sectarian" Standard in Theory
and Practice, 13 NoTRE DAME J.L. ETHIcs & PuB. POLY 321, 322-24 (1999).
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legislators. Instead, the Court will examine the face of the statu-
tory language to evaluate the statute's purpose. In Bowen v. Ken-
drick,293 for example, the Court held that the AFLA did not have
an improper purpose even though the AFLA specifically called for
the involvement of religious organizations in the implementation
of services to prevent teenage pregnancy.294 The Court concluded
that the AFLA had a legitimate secular purpose because it also
called for the involvement of various other nonreligious groups.295
Charitable Choice mirrors the AFLA in this sense. It author-
izes states to "provide services... through contracts with chari-
table, religious, or private organizations."296 This tiny sentence,
amidst an entire statute detailing the involvement of religious or-
ganizations in providing social welfare services, however, should
not be enough to insulate Congress's actual purpose from exami-
nation. To do so, clearly elevates form over substance to a per-
verse degree.
Even if we allow for this, Charitable Choice's purpose still suf-
fers from other defects that are noticeable upon facial examina-
tion. One of the main purposes of the act is to allow religious in-
stitutions to receive public aid without having to diminish the
religious content of their charitable programs.297 In other words,
Congress wants to give churches money to engage in religious ex-
ercises while administering social services. This purpose is clearly
observable from the statute's syntax: "The purpose of this section
is to allow States to contract with religious organizations,.... on
the same basis as any other nongovernmental provider without
impairing the religious character of such organizations."298
Another subsection specifically prohibits state governments
from excluding religious organizations from contracts based solely
on their sectarian character.299 Congress is clearly going out of its
way to include these religious institutions because of their relig-
ious message.
293. 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
294. Id. at 602.
295. See id.
296. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(a)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1998).
297. See id. § 604a(b).
298. Id. § 604a(b) (emphasis added).
299. Id. § 604a(c).
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Additionally, Charitable Choice fails the first prong of the
Lemon/Agostini test because, like the prohibited action in Larkin
v. Grendel's Den,0 ° it allows for "important, discretionary gov-
ernmental powers... [to be] delegated to or shared with religious
institutions.""0 ' Welfare surely qualifies as an important govern-
ment function, at least to those receiving aid. By providing such a
program and then delegating its implementation to religious
authorities, Congress violated the bold and broad command of the
Larkin case.
After reviewing the words of the bill's sponsor and the lan-
guage of the statute itself, one must conclude that Congress in-
tended to involve religious organizations in providing social serv-
ices. At best, Congress judged that the use of a religious message
is a more effective manner of administering a governmental task.
At worst, Congress wanted to fund religious exercises. Either
way, no secular purpose is legitimately discernable.
B. Charitable Choice Has the Effect of Advancing Religion
1. Charitable Choice May Result in Government Indoctrination
of Religion
In deciding whether government aid results in religious indoc-
trination, the Court analyzes three factors. First, whether the aid
is neutrally distributed to beneficiaries without regard to their
religious nature. Second, whether aid is directed by the private
choice of individuals. Third, whether the aid actually subsidizes
religion.
Charitable Choice allows states to contract with religious or-
ganizations to provide social services "on the same basis as any
other nongovernmental provider."3 02 It prevents discrimination
against religious organizations in the distribution of social service
aid, but does not require that states contract with religious or-
ganizations, exclusively or otherwise.03 The purpose of Charita-
ble Choice is to make government aid for social service available
300. 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
301. Id. at 127.
302. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(b) (Supp. IV 1998).
303. See id. § 604a(a), (c).
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without regard to the religious nature of an institution. ° As to
this point, Charitable Choice simply codifies the constitutional
standard.
The determination as to whether aid is directed by the private
choices of individuals will depend upon the type of program a
state implements. Under Charitable Choice, a state may contract
directly with a religious institution or it may establish a voucher
program that beneficiaries use to redeem services provided by
government contractors, religious or otherwise. °5 A voucher sys-
tem assures that benefits are directed in accordance with a bene-
ficiary's choices. The Court has repeatedly upheld this type of
private choice situation in cases like Witters °6 and Zobrest. °7 In
the Mitchell case, a majority of the Court voiced its approval of
this type of private choice system.08 Justice O'Connor's concur-
rence, joined by Justice Breyer, concluded that when the distribu-
tion of aid is directly steered by the beneficiary, then no objective
message of government endorsement of religion occurs."0 9
A direct contract system presents more difficult problems. If,
for example, State A, decides to simply contract with Church Z to
provide State A's social services, then there is no reason to believe
that the aid is distributed according to private choices. Church Z
is authorized under Charitable Choice to engage in religious ac-
tivities.1 0 The state's decision to fund, therefore, supports any re-
ligious indoctrination that occurs. This situation would not sur-
vive constitutional scrutiny.
The more difficult case involves a per capita distribution sys-
tem that determines grant amounts to religious institutions
based upon how many welfare beneficiaries a religious institution
304. See id. § 604a(b).
305. See id. § 604a(a).
306. Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
307. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1995).
308. Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530, 2544-45 (2000) (plurality opinion). In his plu-
rality opinion, Justice Thomas stated, "If aid... is neutrally available and... passes
through the hands... of numerous private citizens who are free to direct the aid else-
where, the government has not provided any 'support of religion! ... Mhe presence of
private choice is easier to see when aid literally passes through the hands of individuals."
Id.
309. See id. at 2559-60 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
310. See 42 U.S.C. § 604a(d) (Supp. IV 1998) (prohibiting both the federal government
and the states from requiring that religious organizations receiving funds under Charita-
ble Choice alter their religious character).
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serves. A five-member majority of the Court has rejected a per
capita system as a definitively true method of private choice.311
Despite her rhetoric to the contrary, Justice O'Connor approved
of the use of Chapter 2 funds in Mitchell.12 Justice O'Connor
found the fact that no Chapter 2 funds ever reached the coffers of
the religious institution dispositive on the issue of whether the
aid was directed by private choices.313
Unlike the equipment loans at issue in Mitchell, a per capita
distribution of aid under Charitable Choice involves direct cash
payments to religious institutions. 14 This could be the crucial dif-
ference that invalidates a per capita distribution system under
Charitable Choice. Although, like Justice Souter, Justice
O'Connor understands the danger of diverting cash to religious
functions, 5 in that she still requires a plaintiff prove the relig-
ious use of aid.3"6 Charitable Choice encourages religious institu-
tions receiving federal grants to involve "spiritual" elements in
the provision of social services. 7 It is not unthinkable, therefore,
that a plaintiff could demonstrate that a Charitable Choice
grantee diverted federal funds for religious exercises.
A majority of the Court still recognizes that if government aid
subsidizes religious institutions, then that aid results in govern-
ment indoctrination of religion." 8 The Court will look to see if the
governmental aid to religious organizations relieves that institu-
tion of expenses that it would have otherwise incurred under
311. Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2530. "[Tlhe distinction between a per-capita-aid program
and a true private-choice program is important when considering aid that consists of di-
rect monetary subsidies." Id. at 2559 (O'Connor, J., concurring). "Not the least of the sig-
nificant differences between per capita aid and aid individually determined and directed is
the right and genuine opportunity of the recipient to choose not to give the aid." Id. at
2591 (Souter, J., dissenting).
312. See id. at 2572 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
313. See id.
314. See 42 U.S.C. § 604a(b) (Supp. IV 1998).
315. Compare Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2559 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[Tihe distinction
between a per-capita-aid program and a true private-choice program is important when
considering aid that consists of direct monetary subsidies."), with id. at 2585 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) ("[W]e have long held government aid invalid when circumstances would allow
its diversion to religious education.").
316. See id. at 2567 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("To establish a First Amendment viola-
tion, plaintiffs must prove that the aid in question actually is, or has been, used for relig-
ious purposes.").
317. See 42 U.S.C. § 604a(d) (Supp. IV 1998).
318. See Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2541; id. at 2568 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 2583
(Souter, J., dissenting).
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law.319 It is doubtful, however, that a voucher program could ever
rise to this level. Further, it is just as unlikely that a per capita
distribution Charitable Choice system would result in govern-
ment subsidization of religious institutions.
2. Charitable Choice May Define its Recipients by Religion
The validity of this rule was not at issue in Mitchell.32 The
Court seems to be in agreement that if a government program
creates a financial incentive to undergo religious indoctrination,
then the government aid defines its recipients by religion.32' The
plurality would only require that aid be neutral in content in or-
der to pass this test.
322
For the remainder of the Court, however, other considerations
still apply, such as the nature of the institution, the form of the
aid, and the method of distribution.3 23 Direct cash grants to per-
vasively sectarian institutions raise the highest level of scru-
tiny.324 Even the plurality went so far as to recognize this.321 "Of
course, we have seen 'special Establishment Clause dangers'...
when money is given to religious schools or entities directly,
rather than... indirectly."3 26 Charitable Choice authorizes direct
cash payments to pervasively sectarian institutions,327 thus rais-
ing the highest level of divertibility concern.
Also, if a house of worship is the only provider of social services
in a particular jurisdiction, then a genuine incentive to undergo
religious indoctrination exists. Whether that incentive is financial
or otherwise seems immaterial. If a person seeks drug counseling
or job training, and a house of worship that incorporates religious
themes implements the sole program in that jurisdiction, then
there is an incentive to undergo religious indoctrination. If the
319. See id. at 2562 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 2588-89 (Souter, J., dissenting).
320. See id. at 2552; id. at 2561 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
321. See id. at 2543; id. at 2561 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
322. See id. at 2543-44.
323. See id. at 2557, 2562 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 2582 (Souter, J., dissent-
ing).
324. See id. at 2559 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 2583 (Souter, J., dissenting).
325. See id. at 2546.
326. Id. (citations omitted).
327. See 42 U.S.C. § 604a(b) (Supp. IV 1998).
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person is eligible for these programs through government desig-
nation, then the government has created the incentive. Any re-
ligious indoctrination takes place at the behest of the govern-
ment. In this scenario, there is no true private choice. Does it
make logical sense to invalidate such a program only if it creates
a direct financial incentive? Such a distinction is not consistent
with the spirit of the Establishment Clause.
3. Charitable Choice, in Any Form, Involves Excessive
Entanglement of Government and Religion
Charitable Choice seeks to, at least symbolically, benefit insti-
tutions whose entire purpose and character are religious in na-
ture."' It involves those institutions in providing governmental
services, while purposefully protecting their ability to convey re-
ligious messages." 9 The program provides aid to religious organi-
zations and institutions in the form of direct money payments.330
A majority of the Court has disregarded presumptions of diverti-
bility of aid.33' The entire Court, however, still recognizes that di-
rect cash payments to religious institutions raise special concerns
that the aid will be employed to indoctrinate religion.3 2
Implementing Charitable Choice in accordance with its statu-
tory mandate would necessarily involve an excessive and con-
tinuing system of government surveillance of religion. For exam-
ple, 42 U.S.C. § 604a(g) requires that no religious institution
receiving funds under Charitable Choice discriminate against an
individual seeking assistance on the basis of religion.333 An insti-
tution receiving federal funds may not deny services to benefici-
aries who refuse to actively participate in a religious practice.3 '
While subsection (d) guarantees that institutions are not required
328. See id.
329. See Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Charitable Choice:
Churches, Welfare and Your Tax Dollars, at http://www.au.org/welfare.htm (last visited
Apr. 21, 2001). "Although 'charitable choice' technically states that public fumds cannot be
used for religious worship, instruction or proselytization, there is not an overall prohibi-
tion on coerced religious practices." Id.
330. See 42 U.S.C. § 604a(a) (Supp. IV 1998).
331. See Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2547-49; id. at 2565-67 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
332. See id. at 2546; id. at 2559 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 2583 (Souter, J., dis-
senting).
333. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(g) (Supp. IV 1998).
334. See id. § 604a(e)(1).
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to alter their religious character in order to receive funds,3 5 sub-
section (j) prohibits the use of funds for "proselytization."3
How will the government ensure compliance with these contra-
dictory statutory mandates? Any plausibly effective solution will
transcend mere administrative cooperation. If this language is
more than lip service, to be successful, its implementation will
necessitate non-stop government oversight of the manner in
which these institutions provide services to the needy. This not
only raises serious Establishment Clause concerns, it also frus-
trates the proffered secular purpose of the legislation-stream-
lining welfare benefits by avoiding bureaucratic obstacles.
The Charitable Choice legislation also requires that partici-
pating institutions account for federally granted monies under
generally accepted auditing principles.337 Indeed, if an organiza-
tion does not establish a separate account for federal funds, then
the government has the right to audit the entire church treas-
ury.33' By participating in Charitable Choice, a religious organi-
zation abdicates protections afforded to it under the Establish-
ment Clause.
Charitable Choice implicates all of the entanglement dangers
that the Court has recognized under the Establishment Clause. It
involves direct monetary grants to pervasively sectarian institu-
tions. It implicates a symbolic union between Church and State.
In order to comply with its statutory and constitutional require-
ments, Charitable Choice will require a comprehensive and con-
tinuous governmental surveillance of religious activities and fi-
nances.
C. Charitable Choice Violates the Establishment Clause
Charitable Choice has the impermissibly sectarian purpose of
relinquishing governmental responsibilities to religion. Charita-
335. See id. § 604a(d)(1) ("A religious organization with a contract... shall retain its
independence from Federal, State, and local governments, including such organization's
control over the definition, development, practice, and expression of its religious beliefs.").
336. Id. § 604a(j) ("No fimds provided directly to institutions or organizations to pro-
vide services and administer programs... shall be expended for sectarian worship, in-
struction, or proselytization.").
337. See id. § 604a(h)(1).
338. See id. § 604a(h)(2) (providing that if the religious organization segregates funds,
the government will only examine the separate account).
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ble Choice has the effect of advancing religion. This statutory
scheme authorizes direct monetary grants to pervasively sectar-
ian institutions. 39 Aid might be distributed neutrally depending
upon the type of distribution mechanism each state decides to
employ.340 Aid may also only supplement these religious institu-
tions. 4' Nonetheless, by creating incentives to undergo religious
indoctrination, the government is responsible for any religious
indoctrination that occurs. Finally, Charitable Choice results in
excessive entanglement between government and religion due to
the invasive and constant monitoring that will be necessary to
ensure compliance with the statutory safeguards.
V. A CRITIQUE OF NEUTRALITY POLICY
Neutrality theory, as equal treatment of religion or evenhand-
edness, found its origins in scholarly debate.342 The basic tenet of
neutrality theory advocates Establishment Clause jurisprudence
that is more accommodating of religion.343 It has many advocates
in legislative bodies throughout the country,3" and it clearly in-
fluenced Justice Thomas's plurality opinion in Mitchell.4' Its
popularity has resulted in direct government aid to religious pro-
grams like Charitable Choice and its progeny. This section will
discuss some of the major philosophical fallacies that lie at the
heart of the arguments in favor of neutrality theory.
First, neutrality assumes that the rise of the administrative
and regulatory state has preempted religious discourse and is
hostile toward religious belief. Second, neutrality assumes that
its application would result in an equal playing field for religion.
Third, neutrality assumes that allowing religious organizations to
receive government aid on the same basis as nonreligious organi-
zations would cause a rebirth of widespread religious belief
throughout our country.
339. See id. § 604a(b).
340. See supra Part 1V.B.1.
341. See supra Part 1V.B.1.
342. See, e.g., Carl H. Esbeck, Myths, Miscues and Misconceptions: No-Aid Separation-
ism and the Establishment Clause, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHIcS & PUB. POLY 285 (1999).
343. See id. ("In neutrality theory the recipients of vouchers, grants, and purchase-of-
service contracts are eligible to participate as providers in government service programs
without regard to their religious character.").
344. See, e.g., id. at 285-86.
345. See Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2541-44.
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A. Neutrality Assumes That the Rise of the Administrative State
Is Hostile to Religion
Many scholars advocating a neutrality or "equal treatment"
standard contend that the rise of the pervasive regulatory and
administrative state makes impossible the use of a strict separa-
tion model of Establishment Clause analysis.346 The rise of big
government has resulted in secularized religious institutions and
the diminished role of religion in American society in general.34
[With the arrival of the New Deal and explosive growth in the
regulatory/welfare state, enforcing strict separation confined relig-
ious education and charitable ministries to ever smaller and smaller
enclaves. If the two were not to mix, religion had to recede as the
state grew larger. Thus, if social-service ministries and schools were
to participate in government's largess, the theory demanded that re-
ligious social services and schools must first become secular.... To
increasing numbers of Americans, strict separationism presents a
cruel choice between suffering funding discrimination or forced
secularization.
348
These scholars view the secularization of these functions as
hostile to religious belief in spirit and in practice.3 49 As an alter-
native, equal treatment or neutrality recognizes the importance
of religion and forbids discrimination against it. 350 "The purpose
at work is the minimization of the government's influence over
religious belief and practice. Thus, whether pondering the consti-
tutionality of exemptions from regulatory burdens or equal
treatment in benefit programs, the integrating principle is to re-
duce the impact of governmental action on religious choices."35'
This logic is difficult to grasp. According to these scholars, gov-
ernment has marginalized religion, thus driving people away
from religion.352 Therefore, they seek to minimize the ability of
346. See Carl H. Esbeck, Equal Treatment: Its Constitutional Status, in EQUAL
TREATMENT OF RELIGION IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY 13 (Steven V. Monsma & J. Christo-
pher Soper eds., 1998).
347. See id.
348. Id.
349. See Michael W. McConnell, Equal Treatment and Religious Discrimination, in
EQUAL TREATMENT OF RELIGION IN A PLURALISTIC SoCIEY 30 (Steven V. Monsma & J.
Christopher Soper eds., 1998).
350. See id.
351. Esbeck, supra note 346, at 17.
352. See id. at 13-14; McConnell, supra note 349, at 31.
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government to control religious choices.353 Their solution for this
problem is to increase governmental financial support for relig-
ious beliefs .3 " The logical inconsistency is so deep that it sheds
doubt on its sincerity.
This contention-that the rise of big government has resulted
in an exemption of religion from the lives of Americans-borders
on the absurd. The facts indicate quite the opposite. In a 1994
Gallup poll, ninety-six percent of all Americans stated that they
believe in God. 5 That same poll indicated that religion plays a
significant role in the lives of eighty-eight percent of all Ameri-
cans. 3 6 Between 1970 and 1995, the Southern Baptist Convention
grew by over five million members in the United States, and
many other traditional religious groups-like the National Bap-
tist Convention and the Roman Catholic Church-experienced
similar popularity explosions during this period that supposedly
marked the ultimate emasculation of religion in our society.357
Pro-religious lobbying groups have also gained enormous finan-
cial power during this period. "[T]he Christian Coalition and the
fast-rising Promise Keepers movement boast large budgets of $25
million and $115 million, respectively."31
These statistics point to an obvious conclusion: the rise of the
administrative state has not led to the marginalization of relig-
ion, or religious belief in our society at all. In fact, the data sug-
gests an increased religious fervor in our country. Religion in the
United States is as healthy as it ever has been.
353. See Esbeck, supra note 346, at 17; McConnell, supra note 349, at 32.
354. See McConnell, supra note 349, at 32.
355. Rogers M. Smith, "Equal" Treatment? A Liberal Separationist View, in EQUAL
TREATMENT OF RELIGION IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY 187 (Steven V. Monsma & J. Christo-
pher Soper eds., 1998) (citing GEORGE GALLUP, JR., THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION
1995 (1996)).
356. See id.
357. Id. at 187-88 (citing GEORGE GALLUP, JR., THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION
1995 (1996)) (reflecting that the Southern Baptist Convention grew from 11.3 to 15.4 mil-
lion members, the National Baptist Convention grew from 5.5 to 8.2 million members, and
the Roman Catholic Church grew from 47.9 to 59 million members).
358. Id. at 188 (citing Joe Conason et al., The Promise Keepers are Coming: The Third
Wave of the Religious Right, THE NATION, Oct. 7, 1996, at 11).
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B. Neutrality Theory Falsely Assumes That Equal Treatment
Will Affect All Religions Equally
Neutrality theory argues that if the government offers a benefit
to a secular entity, it should offer an identical benefit to religious
bodies. 9 That way, government action will neither disfavor re-
ligion nor place it in a preferential position. 6 ' This argument un-
dermines the type of "neutrality" that the Establishment Clause
preserves. That is, neutrality theory, in practice, would ignore
neutrality between religions.
The experiences of our nation's Founding Fathers, in both
Europe and Colonial America, suggest that the Establishment
Clause had as its primary purpose the prevention of inter-
sectarian conflict and government persecution of minority relig-
ious views."' Religiously inspired warfare and sectarian persecu-
tion plagued both continental Europe and Great Britain through-
out the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 62 Roger Williams,
Rhode Island's founder and influential colonial theologian, linked
the bloody religious conflicts of Europe to the blending of civil and
ecclesiastical functions.363
In 1785, the General Assembly of Virginia considered a bill for
the allocation of state money to employ teachers of Christianity.3
In response to that bill, James Madison, author of the Establish-
ment Clause, composed his famous Memorial and Remonstrance
against Religious Assessments.365 In this work, Madison argues
359. See McConnell, supra note 349, at 32-33.
360. See id.
361. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-11 (1947).
362. See id.
363. See Roger Williams, The Bloody Tenent, of Persecution for Cause of Conscience, in
5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 48 (Phillip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
God requireth not an uniformity of religion to be enacted and enforced in any
civil state; which enforced uniformity, sooner or later, is the greatest occasion
of civil war, ravishing consciences, persecution of Christ Jesus in His ser-
vants, and of hypocrisy and destruction of millions of souls .... An enforced
uniformity of religion throughout a nation or civil state confounds the civil
and religious, denies the principles of Christianity and civility, and that Je-
sus Christ is come in the flesh.
Id.
364. See A Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion, re-
printed in Everson, 330 U.S. at 72 (supplemental appendix).
365. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments, in 5
THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 363, at 82.
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that governmental aid of religion usually enables a tyrannical
ruler to employ religion as a suppressive device over minority
viewpoints. 366
What influence in fact have ecclesiastical establishments had on
Civil Society? In some instances they have been seen to erect a spiri-
tual tyranny on the ruins of the Civil authority; in many instances
they have been seen as upholding the thrones of political tyranny; in
no instance have they been seen the guardians of the liberties of the
people. 367
Indeed, the pre-Everson period of American history was marred
by a prevalent government endorsement of Protestantism.3 68 This
period also, not coincidentally, corresponded to an intolerance of
fringe minority religious views, such as those of the Mormons and
the Native Americans.369
There is no reason to believe that the use of criteria neutral
toward religion in distributing aid will result in a return to this
type of religious persecution. However, the fact of the matter is
that America is still a nation of primarily Christian believers.
While the twentieth century saw an explosion in religious diver-
sity in this country, Protestants and Catholics still make up
ninety-one percent of all churchgoers in America.3 70 Under neu-
trality-based aid programs, these groups are able to employ sig-
nificant financial resources to effectively monopolize government
benefits.
Since there are now approximately two thousand identifiable relig-
ions and sects in this nation, it would be impossible to distribute
government monies fairly and equitably among them all. Instead,
governments at all levels would be forced to make hard choices about
which faith groups would receive public money, which would neces-
sarily result in weighing the utility of certain religious programs. In-
evitably, those with the most financial resources and political clout
would get the largest share of the pie; smaller, less popular faith-
366. See id.
367. Id. at 83.
368. See Smith, supra note 355, at 186.
369. See id.; see also McConnell, supra note 349, at 31 (noting that "[iun the decades
preceding World War II, the dominant Protestant majority in this country not infrequently
ran roughshod over the rights of others: Catholics, Jews, and non-Christians generally").
370. Smith, supra note 355, at 187 (citing GEORGE GALLUP, JR., THE GALLUP PoLL:
PUBLIC OPINION 1995 (1996)).
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groups would be forced to the periphery in the new climate of de-
structive competition among American communities of faith.37 '
This may explain why many Jewish organizations, represent-
ing members of the largest religious minority in the United
States, passionately oppose any blurring of bright-line separa-
tionism.372 According to Gregg Ivers, a prominent Jewish legal
scholar, despite their widespread success in this country, the
overwhelming majority of American Jews insist more adamantly
than ever on a complete separation of Church and State.373 For
Jews, history has repeatedly and painfully reinforced that gov-
ernment support of religion leads to, or at least facilitates, anti-
Semitic regimes. 7 Separationism, at the very least, prohibits
government endorsement of majoritarian theology.3 75 At most, it
prevents government persecution of minority religions.7 6 Jews
feel that they have flourished in America, as in no other country,
because the Establishment Clause restrains government support
for the political objectives of majoritarian religious viewpoints.3 77
Neutrality theory is misnomered and misguided. While it advo-
cates neutrality between secular and sacred institutions, it ig-
nores the plight of religious minorities.3 78 Thus, neutrality theory
does not address the primary concern of the Establishment
Clause: the protection of religious minorities from government
sponsored disfavor or even persecution. Instead, "it demonstrates
little concern for the counter-majoritarian check on the power of
religious majorities to curry government favor."379
371. Derek H. Davis, A Christian Separationist Perspective, in EQUAL TREATMENT OF
RELIGION IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY 136, 147 (Steven V. Monsma & J. Christopher Soper
eds., 1998).
372. See Gregg Ivers, American Jews and the Equal Treatment Principle, in EQUAL
TREATMENT OF RELIGION IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY, supra note 371, at 158, 174.
373. See id.
374X See id. ("Jews, a religious minority, have never faired well in the theologies of
Christian religions. Christian theology... has cast Jews as thieves, liars, predators, mur-
derers, and above all, those responsible for the crucifixion of Jesus Christ.").
375. See id.
376. See id.
377. See id.
378. See id.
379. Id. at 177.
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C. Neutrality Theory Assumes That Separationism Is Hostile
Toward Religious Belief
Contrary to the rhetoric of the neutrality scholars, a strong Es-
tablishment Clause is not hostile toward religion. It does not
equate to, as a prominent scholar (and attorney for Jefferson
Parish in the Mitchell case) suggested, "a one-sided freedom from
religion."" ° In fact, "the church-state divide is a benefit because it
protects the sacred from the secular-not the other way
around.""8 ' Government programs of aid to religious institutions,
like Charitable Choice, infuse capital into church-related chari-
ties at the expense of institutional autonomy. They subject those
institutions to government oversight and financial auditing.382
Charitable Choice, for example, is a confusing statutory
scheme. How can one expect the religious organizations them-
selves to differentiate between prohibited functions (proselytiza-
tion) and permitted functions (engaging in religious exercises)?
Certainly, the line dividing the permissible from the impermissi-
ble is not precise. If these institutions cross that line, wherever it
lies, the government will have free reign to meddle and tweak the
inner workings of religious organizations so as to prevent further
violations. If the government can not remedy the situation, then
its safeguards are either constitutionally insufficient or a pretext
for government sponsorship of majoritarian religious activities.
Neutrality theory, not separationism, truly demeans religious
belief. By definition, neutrality places religion on an equal footing
with the secular. Since religion enjoys a preferred status under
our Constitution, this is a demotion of religion, not a promotion.
If equal treatment prevails,... one's religious faith would be on a
par with every other worldview and life belief.... At the same time,
as religious speech and practice are reduced to the level of secular
speech and practice, American churches lose their protection from
governmental encroachment. The situation will worsen if equal
treatment is broadened to allow funding of religious activities and
institutions.
383
380. McConnell, supra note 349, at 31.
381. Henry G. Brinton, It's Tempting, But My Church Says No Thanks, WASH. POST,
Sept. 10, 2000, at B1.
382. See supra Part lV.B.3.
383. Davis, supra note 371, at 154-55.
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Government subsidization of religious activities has an even
more corrosive effect upon the religious mission of churches be-
yond these invasive procedures."8 First, direct government aid to
religious organizations dilutes the volunteer spirit that drives
those institutions. In Germany, where the government financially
supports religion, weekly church attendance is a dismal five per-
cent. 85 Here in the United States, we have a robust forty-four
percent attendance rate. 86 Additionally, government sponsorship
risks turning these volunteer-driven operations of genuine com-
passion into mere social service bureaucracies. Pastor Henry
Brinton of the Calvary Presbyterian Church in Alexandria, Vir-
ginia sums it up well:
I worry about the damage that government can do to religion when
the wall between church and state is breached. And I wonder
whether communities of faith can remain vibrant volunteer organi-
zations, with strong patterns of private giving, once they have grown
accustomed to federal funding.... The vitality of our churches de-
pends on the community's spirit of giving and participating, and it
has long been my belief that people are most committed to activities
that they choose to support with their disposable income-including
Church.387
Neutrality operates from the assumption that government aid
to religion empowers religion. Yet, nothing could be further from
the truth. Government aid to religious programs requires inva-
sive government oversight and weakens the voluntary spirit of
those institutions. What is so wrong with a strict separationist
system that requires religious institutions to survive solely on
voluntary contributions? Benjamin Franklin eloquently summa-
rized this idea:
When a Religion is good I conceive that it will support itself; and
when it cannot support itself, and God does not care to support it, so
that its Professors are obliged to call for the help of the Civil Power,
'tis a sign, I apprehend, of its being a bad one!3
384. See Stanley W. Carlson-Thies, "Don't Look to Us": The Negative Response of the
Churches to Welfare Reform, 11 NOTRE DAiE J.L. ETHIcs & PuB. POLY 667 (1997).
385. See Brinton, supra note 381.
386. See id.
387. Id.
388. Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Richard Price (Oct. 9, 1780), reprinted in 8 THE
WORKS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 506 (Jared Sparks ed., Boston, Hillard, Gray and Co.,
1882).
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D. Policy Conclusion
Neutrality theory-as articulated by the plurality in Mitchell,
legislative proposals of direct government aid like Charitable
Choice, and legal scholarship-does not further the interests of
religion. Neutrality theory suggests that the increased size of
government and the application of strict separationism has re-
sulted in the marginalization of religion in American society. 89
Yet, the factual evidence contradicts this assertion so violently
that it calls into question the purity of the intentions of those who
insist that they simply want to see religion treated equally 90
Neutrality theory is not neutral as between various religious be-
liefs."' In fact, neutrality theory fails to address the protection of
minority religious views, the primary purpose of the Establish-
ment Clause.392 Even if we were to take the protestations of neu-
trality advocates at face value, there is no reason to conclude that
treating religion equally is anything but undesirable. This would
demote religion from its constitutionally protected status, result-
ing in a marginalization of true religious beliefs. Government
funding of religion endangers the spirit of volunteerism that
drives successful churches.
VI. CONCLUSION
From the dawn of the Supreme Court's modern Establishment
Clause jurisprudence, the Court's stance has swung from opposite
ends of the intellectual spectrum. Since Mueller v. Allen, 93 the
Court has emphasized that the private choices of individuals are
extremely important in determining whether government aid to
religion has the effect of advancing religion. Private choices allow
the Court to attribute religious indoctrination to the individual's
decision, rather than the government's decision to fund. The
Court has also consistently examined the nature of the institution
receiving aid. Greater scrutiny applies when aid goes to institu-
tions that so intertwine secular and sacred functions as to make
389. See supra Part V.A.
390. See supra Part V.A.
391. See supra Part V.B.
392. See supra Part V.B.
393. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
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the two indistinguishable. Finally, the Court's decisions indicate
that the type of aid and the manner in which it is distributed will
influence the constitutionality of government aid to religion. Cash
grants paid directly to religious institutions raise the highest
level of concern.
Government aid to religion cases are complex and dense. The
Mitchell decision, however, illustrates the Court's three distinct
stances on the issue. First, the plurality's decision rejects all of
the previously mentioned principles of the Court's modern Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence.394 Instead, the plurality finds that
formal neutrality ensures sanctuary from Establishment Clause
invalidation. 95 Where aid is distributed based upon non-religious
criteria, and the aid itself is not religious in nature, the govern-
ment has not violated the Establishment Clause. 96 It is not con-
cerned when aid is converted to religious purposes because no in-
doctrination that occurs is coerced by the government.397 The
plurality emasculates the principle of private choice to the point
that ad hoc per capita aid distribution functions as a system of
private choice.
Like the plurality, Justice O'Connor's concurrence rejects many
of the presumptions that the Court previously erected pertaining
to the divertibility of government aid to religion. Unlike the plu-
rality, however, she feels that the actual diversion of government
aid for religious purposes still violates the Establishment
Clause.39 The principles of private choice and neutral-aid criteria
are only factors in making an Establishment Clause judgment.399
Direct aid to pervasively sectarian institutions will raise the level
of scrutiny."0 In the end, the concurring justices tend to rely upon
factual data, indicating a nexus between government aid and re-
ligious indoctrination.4 '
Finally, the separationist wing of the Court, led by Justice
Souter, continues to advocate the presumptions of cases like Meek
394. See supra Part II.B.3.
395. See supra Part II.B.4.
396. See supra Part 1I.B.3.
397. See supra Part II.B.3.
398. See supra Part I.C.I.
399. See supra Part III.C.I.
400. See supra Part HI1C.2.
40L See supra Part IHI.C.2.
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and Lemon concerning the divertibility of aid for religious pur-
poses. °2 This wing of the Court will oppose any type of govern-
ment aid to religion because it violates the purposes behind the
Establishment Clause-the separation of the functions of gov-
ernment and religion. °3
When analyzing the constitutional status of Charitable Choice,
it is readily apparent that there can be no definitive answer at
this time, due to the fact that most states have yet to implement
Charitable Choice programs. More significantly, the splintered
nature of the plurality in Mitchell fails to give proper guidance on
the issue of direct aid to religious institutions. If the factions hold
true to form, Justices O'Connor and Breyer will determine the
outcome. While they concurred in Mitchell, there are several fac-
tors that may influence them to swing the opposite direction un-
der Charitable Choice. First, the secular purpose of Charitable
Choice is dubious, at best. Second, Charitable Choice permits di-
rect cash payments to religious institutions. Third, Charitable
Choice encourages religious use of federal grants. Fourth, the
Charitable Choice statute necessitates severe and oppressive gov-
ernmental interference with religion.
While much of the Court's jurisprudence is unclear, what is
clear is that aid to religious programs, like Charitable Choice, are
more politically popular than they have ever been. Jurists, legal
scholars, and, most of all, legislators have openly embraced a re-
turn to the direct government interference in religious matters.
More can be expected in the future.
This is disturbing on many levels. First, it operates from the
false presumption that the rise of the administrative state has
weakened religion. Not only does this speak solely to the sound-
ness of the expansive regulatory state, it also ignores reality. Re-
ligion in America abounds. Government aid to religious programs
may seem to advance the cause of religious beliefs that inspire
humanity and humility. Yet, this is simply not the case. Govern-
ment aid to religion allows the state to employ religion as an arm
of its policy, making religion subject to the whims of the masses.
This creates inter-sectarian conflict whereby stronger religions
employ their vast resources and connections to the state to sup-
402. See supra Part II.D.2.
403. See supra Part III.D.2.
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press unpopular minority religious views. Most importantly, gov-
ernment aid to religion dilutes the power and beauty of true re-
ligious belief by discouraging volunteerism and converting
churches into bureaucracies. The Establishment Clause wisely
sought to eliminate such concerns by removing religious matters
from political discourse. The Supreme Court would be wise to
follow this mandate.
David J. Freedman

